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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ("Act" or "Telecommunications Act")1 to
promote competition and encourage develop-
ment and implementation of innovative telecom-
munications for consumers.2 In its deliberations,
Congress determined that regulated monopolies
had not provided American consumers with the
prices and innovative technologies that a competi-
tive industry might achieve.3 The Act opens the
local exchange market and subsequently the long
distance market to potential telecommunications
carriers previously excluded from competing in
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these markets.4 The Act also mandates reforms to
mechanisms that facilitate universal telecommuni-
cations service.5
Through the Act, Congress established a sub-
stantive and procedural framework by which po-
tential competitors might enter the local ex-
change market. Substantively, Congress sought to
encourage competition by permitting Alternative
Local Exchange Carriers ("ALEC") to provide lo-
cal exchange telephone service by three means.
First, Congress envisioned competition through
wholesale purchase and resale of an Incumbent
Local Exchange Carrier's ("ILEC") existing retail
assistance in the development and review of the Fifth
Amendment analysis.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
2 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124 [hereinafter House Conf Re-
port].
3 S. REP. No. 104-23, at 2 (1996).
4 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252, 271 (West Supp. 1996).
5 Id. § 254.
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telephone services. 6 Second, Congress permitted
ALECs to purchase from ILECs unbundled net-
work elements,7 either singly or in combination,
in order to provide telecommunications services.8
Third, Congress permitted ALECs to erect their
own network facilities and interconnect with the
ILECs' networks "for the transmission and rout-
ing of telephone exchange service and exchange
access . . . at any technically feasible point within
the carrier's network."9 Procedurally, the Act di-
rects ALECs and ILECs to negotiate interconnec-
tion agreements.10 If the parties cannot agree on
the terms for interconnection, the Act provides
for the compulsory arbitration, by state commis-
sions, of the open issues between the parties, in-
cluding the determination of just and reasonable
rates for interconnection and unbundled network
element charges."
The Act's only guidance on the pricing of un-
bundled network elements is that rates for these
elements be just, reasonable, and nondiscrimina-
tory, and based on cost without reference to rate-
of-return or other rate-based proceedings. 12 In a
controversial move, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), on August 8, 1996, issued a
First Report and Order' iestablishing the methodol-
6 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c) (4) (A) (West Supp. 1996) (man-
dating that ILECs have the duty "to offer for resale at whole-
sale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier
provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunica-
tions carriers").
7 The Act defines "network element" as:
[F]acility or equipment used in the provision of a tele-
communications service. Such term also includes fea-
tures, functions, and capabilities that are provided by
means of such facility or equipment, including sub-
scriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and infor-
mation sufficient for billing and collection or used in
the transmission, routing, or other provision of a tele-
communications service.
Id. § 153(29).
8 Id. § 251(c)(3) (mandating that ILECs "shall provide
such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows
requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to
provide such telecommunications service.").
9 Id. §§ 251(c) (2) (A), 251(c) (2) (B).
10 Id. § 252(a).
11 Id. §§ 252(b), 252(c), 252(d).
12 Id. § 251 (d) (1).
13 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnec-
tion between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mo-
bile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15499 (1996) [hereinafter FCC Order].
14 Id. paras. 618-851.
15 The FCC defines 'joint costs" as "costs incurred when
two or more outputs are produced in fixed proportion by the
same production process (i.e., when one product is pro-
ogy by which state commissions should set prices
for unbundled network elements in the local ex-
change markets.14 The FCC specified that unbun-
dled network elements should be priced at Total
Element Long-Run Incremental Costs, plus a rea-
sonable allocation of joint and common costs
(TERIC Plus).' 5 The TELRIC Plus methodology
measures the forward-looking costs of producing
the entire quantity of each type of unbundled net-
work element an ILEC produces, with reference
to a period of time long enough for all of the
ILEC's fixed costs to become variable or avoida-
ble.16
ILECs claim that this methodology will result in
a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution because the forward-looking pricing of un-
bundled network elements at TELRIC Plus will
fail to compensate the ILECs for all of the histori-
cal, embedded costs1 7 of installing their commu-
nications networks. The ILECs further claim that
a "regulatory compact" between ILECs and state
commissions articulates a promise from states to
the ILECs that the ILECs will be able to recover
these costs in full." Virtually all state commis-
sions that have issued decisions establishing prices
duced, a second product is generated by the same produc-
tion process at no additional cost.)" Id. para. 676. The FCC
defines "common costs" as "costs that are incurred in connec-
tion with the production of multiple products or services,
and remains [sic] unchanged as the relative proportion of
those products or services varies (e.g., the salaries of corpo-
rate managers)." Id.
16 See id. para. 677. In the very long run, an ILEC's fixed
costs can be adjusted to present, not past values because the
period of time will be long enough that present contracts will
have expired, and plant and equipment will need replace-
ment. Id. para. 677 n.1682.
17 "Embedded or accounting costs are costs that firms
incurred in the past for providing a good or service and are
recorded as past operating expenses and depreciation. Due
to changes in input prices and technologies, incremental
costs may differ from embedded costs of that same incre-
ment." Id. para. 675.
18 In an attempt to overturn the FCC requirements with
respect to use of the TELRIC Plus methodology and other
pricing requirements, the ILECs filed suits, consolidated in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, requesting
and receiving a temporary stay of the pricing provisions of
the FCC Order on the grounds that the FCC lacked jurisdic-
tion to regulate the pricing of intrastate telecommunications
services. Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1360-61
(8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996), motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct.
429 (1996). The stay, however, did not limit the freedom of
state public service commissions to weigh competing con-
cerns and price unbundled network elements at 'just and
reasonable" TELRIC Plus rates in order to promote competi-
tion, consistent with the Act. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Util.
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for unbundled network elements, however, have
employed forward-looking pricing methodologies
in the development of these rates.' 9 These deci-
sions assuredly will generate constitutional chal-
lenges by incumbent carriers in the future.
This Article analyzes the Act and the FCC meth-
odology in light of the developed takings jurispru-
dence and evaluates the legal and factual under-
pinnings of the ILECs' claim that pricing of
unbundled network elements at TELRIC plus a
reasonable allocation of joint and common costs
constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking without just
compensation. Ultimately, this Article concludes
that the incumbent carriers' takings argument is
premature because it precedes implementation of
the full statutory scheme the Act establishes; that
this statutory scheme justly compensates incum-
bent carriers for the use of their unbundled net-
work elements; and that, pursuant to the relevant
constitutional considerations, neither the Act nor
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology constitutes
a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
II. THE PRO-COMPETITION PURPOSE AND
PRICING PROVISIONS OF THE




Under established constitutional jurisprudence,
a statutory scheme which justly compensates a reg-
ulated entity for any constitutionally significant
Comm'n, Arbitration Decision, MPUC P-442, 407/M-96-939,
at 3 (Nov. 12, 1996).
19 See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Arbitration Rep.
and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 25704, at 57 (Jan. 31, 1997);
Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. 96-440, at 21-22
(Dec. 23, 1996); Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, Arbitration
Decision, MPUC P-442, 407/M-96-939, at 18 (Nov. 12, 1996);
Texas Pub. Util. Comm'n, Arbitration Award, PUC Dkt. Nos.
16189, 16196, 16226, 16285, 16290, at 25 (Nov. 7, 1996).
State public service commissions have been hampered by
the lack of documentation of the cost studies produced by
incumbent carriers. To the extent that state commissions
have priced unbundled network elements in accordance with
incumbent carriers' forward-looking cost studies, these stud-
ies may or may not support pro-competition prices. Many
commissions have opted for temporary rates to satisfy statu-
tory deadlines, while acknowledging that further provision
and evaluation of incumbent carrier cost studies and infor-
mation is necessary.
20 See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245
(1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255 (1980); Munn v. Illi-
diminution of property value, will not run afoul of
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against takings
without just compensation unless the scheme fails
to substantially advance a legitimate state inter-
est.2 0 As described below, the Act sets forth a stat-
utory scheme which Congress has determined
substantially advances legitimate state interests.
ILECs cannot and have not raised any serious
challenges to the propriety of the state interest or
the degree to which the Act advances that inter-
est. No constitutional infirmity appears to exist
with regard to either aspect.
A. The Act
The Act's stated purpose is "to promote compe-
tition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for Ameri-
can telecommunications consumers and en-
courage the rapid deployment of new telecommu-
nications technologies." 21 The legislative history
of the Act similarly states that Congress intended,
"to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory
national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technolo-
gies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition
. . . ." In addition, the Act also preserves the
traditional goals of universal service. 23
In passing the Act, Congress faced the daunting
challenge of encouraging entry into local ex-
change markets in which the costs and risks of fa-
cilities-based entry appeared prohibitively high.24
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1976).
21 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
22 House Conf Report, supra note 2, at 113.
23 Id. § 254. Universal service is the concept that certain
basic telephone services should be made available to all
Americans at affordable prices. Id. § 254(b) (3). The Act
notes that "universal service" is "an evolving level of telecom-
munications services that the [FCC] shall establish periodi-
cally under this section, taking into account advances in tele-
communications and information technologies and services."
Id. § 254(c) (1). The PCC Order states that it views universal
service reform as the second part of a "competition trilogy,"
which includes interconnection under Section 251 and ac-
cess charge reform. FCC Order, supra note 13, paras. 6-8.
24 BellSouth's property, plant and equipment investment
in the southeast region, for example, totaled $46.9 billion
dollars at year end 1995. BELLSOUTH CORPOIATION, Notice
of 1996 Annual Meeting A-29 (1996) [hereinafter BellSouth
1996 Notice]. GTE, which provides local exchange service in
multiple area franchises nation-wide, had, at year end 1995,
property, plant and equipment investments on the order of
2331997]
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In order to reduce barriers to market entry, Con-
gress mandated that ILECs satisfy the aforemen-
tioned interconnection requirements, in addition
to selling, at wholesale, their existing services and
access to unbundled network elements.25 The Act
requires that state commissions set prices for such
interconnection and sale. 26
B. The FCC Order
The FCC's implementation of Section 251 of
the Act, embodied in its First Report and Order, re-
flects the FCC's intent to comply with the underly-
ing pro-competition goals of the Act.2 7 In adopt-
ing the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology, the
FCC recognized that " [a] dopting a pricing meth-
odology based on forward-looking, economic
costs best replicates, to the extent possible, the
conditions of a competitive market." 28 The FCC
further stated that, as a result, the TELRIC Plus
methodology "allows the requesting carrier to
produce efficiently and to compete effectively,
which should drive retail prices to their competi-
tive levels." 29
To establish the forward-looking incremental
costs of unbundled network elements, the FCC
first determined the network architecture that
best reflected the costs a competitive provider
would face in establishing its service.30 The FCC
determined that state commissions should iden-
tify the costs associated with a telecommunica-
$50.9 billion dollars. GTE 1995 ANNUAL REP. 36 (1996)
[hereinafter GTE 1995 Annual Report]. By this measure, pure
facilities-based competition with monopoly providers would
emerge, if at all, only after decades and would require that
potential market-entrants invest billions of dollars in the
hopes of one day luring enough customers away from ILECs
to produce a return on this investment.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
26 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (West Supp. 1996).
27 FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 3.
28 Id. para. 679; see also id. para. 705 ("The substantial
weight of economic commentary in the record suggests that
an 'embedded cost'-based pricing methodology [vice
TELRIC Plus] would be pro-competitor - in this case the in-
cumbent LEC - rather than pro-competition.") (citations
omitted).
29 Id. para. 679.87
30 Id. paras. 683-85.
31 Id. para. 685.
32 Id.
33 Id. In reaching its decision, the FCC rejected two
other possible bases for the TELRIC Plus calculation: calcu-
lation based on the existing network configuration, at one
extreme, and calculation based on the least-cost, most effi-
cient network configuration and technology currently avail-
tions network employing the most efficient ex-
isting technology given the ILECs' existing wire
center locations.31 These wire center locations
contain the critical switching systems central to
the provision of wireline telecommunications
services. According to the FCC, "[t]h[e] bench-
mark of forward-looking cost and existing net-
work design most closely represents the incremen-
tal costs that incumbents actually expect to incur
in making network elements available to new en-
trants."3 2 Moreover, the FCC believed that pric-
ing unbundled network elements using this con-
firguration would encourage facilities-based
competition because "new entrants, by designing
more efficient network configurations, [would
be] able to provide the service at a lower cost than
the incumbent LEC," and thus would have eco-
nomic incentive to continue the deployment of
innovative technologies to the benefit of consum-
ers.33
C. Legitimacy of the Regulatory Scheme
The pro-competition regulatory scheme Con-
gress has established through the Act clearly con-
stitutes government action within the constitu-
tional scope of Congress' power to regulate use of
private property for public purposes. As a general
matter, the Constitution permits government reg-
ulation of private property put to public use, if the
regulation promotes the public welfare.34 More
able, at the other. Id. paras. 683-85. The FCC believed that
the former configuration would not produce economically
efficient forward-looking pricing because this configuration
embodied all inefficiency and obsolescence in the ILECs ex-
isting networks. Id. para. 684. The latter configuration
would discourage facilities-based competition because it
would price existing networks as though they were the most
cost effective, leaving market entrants with no incentive to
install optimally efficient facilities. Id. para. 683.
34 See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253
(1987) ("It is of course settled beyond dispute that regulation
of rates chargeable from the employment of private property
devoted to public uses is constitutionally permissible");
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
163 (1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (land use regulation does not effect a taking if it will
"substantially advance legitimate state interests" or does not
"den [y] an owner economically viable use of his land");
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1876) ("when private
property is devoted to public use, it is subject to public regu-
lation"); Tenoco Oil Co., Inc., v. Department of Consumer
Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It is beyond dispute
that ... [government] may legitimately regulate the prices of
staples like gasoline if it thinks that the public interest re-
quires.").
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specifically, judicial precedent confirms that Con-
gress may regulate in order to promote competi-
tion. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 3 5 the Court,
for example, held that regulation permitting re-
lease of valuable trade secret data of companies
under Environmental Protection Agency regula-
tory jurisdiction was a proper exercise of govern-
mental authority where this release would avoid
costly duplication of work, reduce significant en-
try barriers to the regulated market, and expedite
the availability of new end-use products to con-
sumers.3 6 The permissible governmental purpose
in Ruckeishaus and the purpose that Congress es-
poused in passing the Telecommunications Act -
the reduction of barriers to, and encouragement
of, competition - are equivalent.37
Mere enactment of a regulatory scheme will
not, in itself, constitute a taking unless the statute
regulating property uses "does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land.. . ." 38
Moreover, the Takings Clause recognizes "the
government's power to regulate subject only to
the dictates of justice and fairness."' 3 9
In the field of utility regulation, justice and fair-
ness exist within a "broad zone of reasonable-
ness," 40 and the Constitution only protects utili-
ties "from being limited to a charge for their
property serving the public which is so 'unjust' as
to be confiscatory." 41 In this regard, the
Supreme Court has specifically held that rates
35 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
36 Id. at 1015 ("Such a procompetitive purpose is well
within the police power of Congress.").
37 Cf Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 245-47 (no taking
exists where government, as a means to prevent anticompeti-
tive practices by monopolistic utilities, requires a utility
under contract with cable television operators to permit use
of utility poles at lower government-set prices if these prices
provide just compensation); Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v.
ICC, 792 F.2d 287 (2nd Cir. 1985) ("[T]o foster competition
the [government] can order a [railroad] carrier to give an-
other carrier trackage or terminal rights")).
38 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
39 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
40 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770
(1968).
41 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1989) (citing Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v.
Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896) ("A rate is too low if it is
'so unjust as to destroy the value of the property for all the
purposes for which it was acquired,' and in so doing 'practi-
cally deprives the owner of property without due process of
law"'); Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America, 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) ("By long standing usage
in the field of rate regulation, the 'lowest reasonable rate' is
based on the actual present value of property are
constitutional. 4 2 In fact, in the past the Supreme
Court has taken the position that the only consti-
tutionally permissible method for valuing prop-
erty was in accordance with the actual present
value of the private property put to public use, be-
cause this method best mimicked the operation of
a competitive market.4 3 Later, the Court allowed
other permissible pricing methodologies, includ-
ing those based on "historical cost," that were ac-
cepted upon a determination that they, too, could
produce results within the zone of reasonable-
ness.4
There is no impermissible constitutional taking
if the government provides just compensation for
private property put to public purpose. 45 More-
over, where the statutory framework provides the
mechanism for negotiation or arbitration of just
compensation, but not the compensation itself,
the statutory scheme nevertheless is constitution-
ally sound.4 6 Finally, specific constitutional chal-
lenge to an arbitration or negotiation mechanism
on the grounds that this mechanism fails to pro-
vide just compensation will fail if an alternative
means exists whereby an aggrieved party can state
a claim against the government for recovery of
just compensation.4 7 ILECs have such an alterna-
tive means. They may seek just compensation in
the United States Court of Federal Claims pursu-
ant to the Tucker Act, if the statutory scheme
Congress established does not provide it.48 Ac-
one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense");
Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-392
(1974) ("All that is protected against, in a constitutional
sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher
than a confiscatory level")).
42 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308 (citing Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898)).
43 Id. at 308.
44 Id. at 310 (noting that in Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), the Court aban-
doned the notion that the actual present value method was
the only constitutionally acceptable method of fixing utility
rates).
45 See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp. 480 U.S. 245, 253
(1987).
46 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013
(1984).
47 See id. at 1018-19.
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994). Under the Tucker Act,
the United States Court of Federal Claims has "jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Con-
gress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
1997] 235
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cordingly, ILECs may not challenge the state com-
missions' application of TELRIC Plus or other for-
ward-looking pricing methodologies on grounds
that it violates the Fifth Amendment. Their chal-
lenges to the state commissions' actions must be
on grounds that the established rates do not com-
ply with the Act.4 9
III. ANY CHALLENGE TO THE JUSTNESS
OF THE COMPENSATION PROVIDED
UNDER THE ACT IS PREMATURE
PENDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
STATUTORY SCHEME
Any constitutional challenge to the justness of
the compensation provided under the Act is pre-
mature pending implementation of the overall
statutory scheme because the Act expressly pro-
vides a mechanism through which ILECs may re-
ceive just compensation. As the Court noted in
Ruckeishaus, "[t] he Fifth Amendment does not re-
quire that compensation precede the taking."50
In the instant case, the statutory framework of the
Act substantially increases the benefits afforded
the ILECs under the existing regulatory frame-
work by providing the ILECs revenue opportuni-
ties in three specific areas, none of which were
available prior to passage of the Act. These bene-
fits would appear to compensate ILECs fairly for
economic impacts resulting from the opening of
local exchange markets. First, Sections 251 and
252 permit ILECs to collect revenue from market
entrants for interconnection with ILEC networks
and the entrants use of unbundled network ele-
ments.5 1 Specifically, the TELRIC Plus methodol-
ogy set forth in the FCC Order ensures that these
tort." Id. § 1491 (a) (1).
49 47 U.S.C.A. § 561 (West Supp. 1996). Congress antici-
pated legal challenges to the FCC's implementation of the
Act and the Act itself and, therefore, enacted a procedure for
expedited review in which any constitutional challenge shall
be heard by a three-judge District Court panel. Id. § 561(a).
Appeals of the District Court decision shall be made directly
to the Supreme Court. Id. § 561 (b).
50 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016.
51 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252 (West Supp. 1996).
52 FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 690.
53 Id. para. 700.
54 Id. paras. 697-98.
55 Id. para. 679.
56 See id.
57 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1996). Section 271
prescribes the guidelines that a Regional Bell Operating
Company ("RBOC") must follow prior to offering long dis-
tance telephone service in its own local service area. Id.
revenues will compensate ILECs for all forward-
looking economic costs of providing unbundled
network elements. 5 2 These economic costs, by
definition, include the costs of capital necessary
to attract investment.53 In addition, the FCC has
required that the prices of unbundled network el-
ements provide a reasonable allocation of the
ILECs joint and common costs.5 4 In competitive
markets, the price consumers will pay for goods or
services tends toward the economic costs of these
products.55 Thus, the TELRIC Plus methodology
is intended and expected to provide ILECs with a
constitutionally sufficient approximation of the
fair market value of their property in a competi-
tive market.56
Second, Section 271 permits the ILECs to vie
for a share of the lucrative long distance market.57
Given consumers' well-developed and long-time
brand name identification with their local ex-
change service providers and given the universally
recognized allure of "one-stop shopping,"5 8
ILECs may be expected to garner a significant
share of the long distance market for consumers
within their local exchange territories within a
short time of entering the market. A recent Mer-
rill Lynch analysis clearly articulates the enor-
mous financial impact of the ILECs' entry into the
long distance market:
GTE ... intends to gain 10% of its $4.8 billion
addressable long distance market within 12
months with negligible cost to the bottom line
.... [T]he company believes its long distance
effort will generate positive earnings impact in
1997, which reflects, in our view, the remarkably
attractive economics facing an [sic] RBOC enter-
ing an adjacent market (long distance). How often
§ 271(c). To provide long distance service in-region, the
RBOC must demonstrate that it is offering access and inter-
connection to its network to a competing local exchange pro-
vider pursuant to an agreement approved by the state public
service commission, or upon proving that no competing pro-
vider has requested access to the incumbent carriers net-
work. Id. §§ 271(c) (1) (A), 271(c) (1) (B). The RBOC also
must demonstrate compliance with a competitive checklist
that ensures that the RBOC has offered access and intercon-
nection with its network on nondiscriminatory terms re-
quired by the Act. Id. §§ 271(c) (2) (A) (ii), 271(c) (2) (B).
58 "One-stop shopping" refers to the capability of a single
telecommunications provider to offer consumers both local
and long distance service. See, e.g., Samuel F. Cullari, Com-
ment, Divestiture II: Is the Local Loop Ripe for Competition, 3
COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 175, 181 (1995) (commenting on
Ameritech Corp.'s restructuring plan to "create twelve indi-
vidual business units, each dedicated to a specific task ...
(and] all under the single Ameritech name").
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is it that an industry wakes up one day, finds its ad-
dressable market expanded by 40 % and can launch the
new service without noticeable dilution and achieve posi-
tive earnings by the second year.59
Third, Section 273 permits the RBOCs to en-
gage in the manufacture and sale of telecommu-
nications equipment, effective on the date of an
RBOC's entry into the long distance market pur-
suant to Section 271.60 RBOCs have made re-
peated attempts to gain entry into these markets
since divestiture in 1984.61 This suggests that the
RBOCs believe manufacture and sales of telecom-
munications equipment has significant revenue
potential.
In addition, Section 254 requires that every pro-
vider of interstate telecommunications services
contribute on "an equitable and nondiscrimina-
tory basis" to federal and state universal service
support mechanisms. 62 These contributions sub-
sidize the cost of service incurred by telecommu-
nications carriers for the provision of service in
rural or other high cost service areas and reduce
the need for ILECs to recover monopoly rents on
other services in order to recover network costs.6 3
Finally, the existence of any economic impact
of the Act is predicated on the actions of consum-
ers. To the extent consumers show strong brand
allegiance to the ILECs, the sale of unbundled
network elements may not come to pass. Any cal-
culation of economic impact on the ILEC's over-
59 MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., UNITED
STATES TELECOM SERVICES - RBOCs & GTE 6 (May 14, 1996)
(emphasis in original).
60 47 U.S.C.A. § 273(a) (West Supp. 1996).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Western Electric, 627 F. Supp.
1090 (D.D.C 1986).
62 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(d) (West Supp. 1996).
63 As stated by Congress, consumers in rural, insular and
high cost areas should have access to "telecommunications
and information services ... that are reasonably comparable
to those services provided in urban areas" at comparable
rates. Id. § 254(b) (3). In a monopoly environment, the pub-
lic policy to make available universal services to all has led to
the pricing of some services at economically inefficient (and
competitively unsustainable) high levels, under the theory
that such pricing was necessary to subsidize the provision of
universal service. FCC Order, supra note 13, para 5. To the
extent that pricing of unbundled network elements at eco-
nomically efficient, pro-competition prices eliminates ineffi-
cient cross subsidization of universal service, Congress envi-
sioned competitively neutral contributions to state and
federal universal service funds which would compensate an
ILEC (or any other carrier providing services to rural, insular
and high cost areas) for certain costs in excess of the subsi-
dized rate. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(d) (West Supp. 1996); see also
House Conf Report, supra note 2, at 131.
all operations requires speculation as to the mag-
nitude of these sales. Such speculation, however,
provides no basis of support for the ILECs' tak-
ings claims.
All of the above-listed revenue streams consti-
tute the mechanism by which ILECs may receive
revenue compensating for the imposition of regu-
latory restrictions on the pricing of unbundled
network elements. On balance, these revenue
benefits may in fact increase the profitability of
the ILECs. As GTE notes in its 1995 Annual Re-
port, "[t]he gains [under the Act] will far out-
weigh the losses. We'll gain from strong market
growth, by entering the long-distance and home-
entertainment markets, and as a wholesaler of
wireline and wireless services."6 4 Additionally,
BellSouth notes that "[a]s a result of the 1996 Act,
BellSouth is freed from many of the laws, regula-
tions and judicial restrictions . .. that [previously]
constrained the provision of voice, data and video
communications throughout its wireline service
territory and elsewhere."6 5 Moreover, Southern
New England Telephone, which entered the long
distance market three years ago, now has a 30%
market share in Connecticut. 66 The Act also has
permitted the Baby Bells6 7 to begin immediate
sale of long-distance service to cellular custom-
ers.6 8 Southwest Bell Communications already
has secured 43% of the long distance market
share with regard to its existing cellular custom-
The Act stresses the goal of universal service by requiring
the initiation ofjoint federal-state proceedings to implement
any regulatory changes pursuant to the Act. Id. § 254(a) (1).
This joint board must measure the recommendations for uni-
versal service reforms against specific principles mandated by
the Act, such as the quality and rates of service, access to ad-
vanced services, access to service in rural and high cost areas,
and specific and predictable federal and state mechanisms to
support universal service. Id. § 254(b). In addition, the Act
requires that the FCC initiate a single proceeding, within fif-
teen months of the enactment of the Act, to implement the
recommendations of the joint board. Id. § 254(a) (2).
64 GTE 1995 Annual Report, supra note 24, at 8.
65 BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-15.
66 Andrew Kupfer, The Telecom Wars, FORTUNE, Mar. 3,
1997, at 138.
67 The 1982 divestiture of AT&T, pursuant to court or-
der, created seven regional bell operating companies
(RBOCs). United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). These seven companies, Pacific Telesis,
SouthWestern Bell, US West, BellSouth, Bell Atlantic,
NYNEX, and Ameritech, are commonly known as the "baby
bells."





None of the compensatory aspects of the statu-
tory framework are fully implemented at the pres-
ent time. Many state commissions have yet even
to establish permanent prices for interconnection
and unbundled network elements.70 Moreover,
these commissions have scarcely begun Section
271 proceedings to determine whether the ILECs
have satisfied the Act's conditions for entry into
the long-distance market.71 In addition, ILEC
manufacture and sale of telecommunications
equipment pursuant to the Act will not occur un-
til the FCC has made the requisite Section 271 ap-
provals triggering these rights. Finally, the FCC
and state commissions have not completed uni-
versal services proceedings designed to adjust sub-
sidies for service to rural or other high cost service
areas.72 As a threshold matter, therefore, until
the statutory scheme is fully implemented, any as-
sessment of whether specific regulations concern-
ing pricing of unbundled network elements effect
a taking without just compensation is premature.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TELRIC PLUS
METHODOLOGY, IN AND OF ITSELF,
JUSTLY COMPENSATES ILECS FOR USE
OF UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS
As discussed above, the Telecommunications
Act establishes a statutory framework that will,
when implemented, fully compensate ILECs for
restrictions placed on the pricing of unbundled
network elements. However, while Sections 251
and 252 prohibit ILECs, in the name of competi-
tion, from charging monopoly rents for unbun-
69 Kupfer, supra note 66, at 138.
70 FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 22.
71 As ofJanuary 1997, the FCC has received only one Sec-
tion 271 application to provide in-region long distance serv-
ices. Letter from Kelly R. Welsh, Executive Vice President
and General Counsel, Ameritech Michigan, to William F. Ca-
ton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission
(Jan. 2, 1997) (on file with the CommLaw Conspectus). This is
not surprising given the uncertainty and delay in the comple-
tion of interconnection agreements, in part created by the
Eighth Circuit's stay of the FCC's pricing rules. See supra note
17. Such agreements are required, inter alia, as part of the
competitive checklist under Section 271 that RBOCs' must
meet to receive FCC approval of in-region long distance serv-
ices. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (2) (B) (West Supp. 1996). Amer-
itech withdrew its application on February 11,1997 after the
FCC ruled that Ameritech had not met the competitive
checklist under Section 271. Ameritech Withdraws Petition to Of-
fer Long Distance in Mich., COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Feb. 12,
1997, at 1.
dled network elements, these sections also man-
date that market entrants pay full value (and thus
provide just compensation) for these elements at
cost-based rates. 74 Accordingly, prices charged to
market entrants for unbundled network elements,
alone, will constitute just compensation for use of
those elements.
Arguing to the contrary, the ILECs have
stressed the need to account for the historical
costs and valuation of their property in assessing
whether application of the TELRIC Plus method-
ology provides just compensation for the alleged
taking.75 The Supreme Court, however, has ob-
served that the Constitution does not require that
property be valued at original purchase price, par-
ticularly where the current market value of the
property is different from the original price:
[T]he due process clause never has been held by this
Court to require a commission to fix rates . . on the
historical valuation of a property whose history and cur-
rent financial statements showed the value no longer to
exist .... The due process clause has been applied to
prevent governmental destruction of existing economic
values. It has not and cannot be applied to insure val-
ues or to restore values that have been lost by the oper-
ation of economic forces. 76
A simple example demonstrates the rationality
of the Court's position: A homeowner purchases a
home at an original cost of $200,000. At some
subsequent time, the value of his home has fallen
to $150,000 because, in the market, the home can
be replicated, or a like home purchased, for
$150,000. The government takes his property in
order to construct a critical government facility.
If the government pays the homeowner $150,000,
it compensates him fully for the current economic
72 The FCC's statutory deadline to promulgate final rules
for Section 254 is May 8, 1997. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(a) (2)
(West Supp. 1996). The FCC, through the recommendations
of the Federal-State Joint Board, "will establish a minimum
level of universal service and determine the way that these
services will be financed." Angela J. Campbell, Universal Ser-
vice Provisions: The "Ugly Duckling" of the 1996 Act, 29 CONN. L.
REv. 187, 191 (1996). The states may not adopt inconsistent
regulations to the federal rules. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(f) (West
Supp. 1996). Thus, until the FCC has released its final rules,
the states cannot complete their universal service proceed-
ings.
7 See supra text and accompanying notes 53-65.
74 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251, 252 (West Supp. 1996).
75 See, e.g., GTE, GTE Takings Rep. Before the Florida
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 9, 17 (1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the COMMLAw CONSPECTUS) [hereinafter GTE
Takings Report].
76 Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548,
567 (1945).
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value of his property. If, however, the govern-
ment pays the homeowner $200,000, this amount
compensates him not only for the value of the
property, but also for losses sustained solely be-
cause of economic forces permitting replication
or purchase of the home for less money.77
The historic, embedded book values which the
ILECs seek are not reflective of current market
values. Recent arbitration proceedings through-
out the country have established this fact. 78 This is
because the technology currently in place is not
the technology of the future. With or without
competition, it is inevitable that the current net-
works will be updated and replaced with techno-
logically advanced equipment. It is the cost of
this equipment that ultimately defines the market
value prices competitors will charge and consum-
ers will pay in the local exchange market.79 Both
ILECs and ALECs agree that these costs will be
less than the costs ILECs have incurred to install
their existing embedded networks. 0 The mere
fact that the ILECs' property values have dimin-
ished due to market forces (e.g., advances in tech-
nology), implicates no constitutional concerns;
thus no takings claim will arise if ILECs receive
compensation equal to the current fair market
value of their networks but less than their historic
costs.
V. PRICING UNBUNDLED NETWORK
ELEMENTS AT TELRIC PLUS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A TAKING
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution re-
quires that "private property [not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation."8 1 As
77 The decision to open the local exchange market to
competition (and corresponding market forces) is separate
from the selection of the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology.
While the perceived free market value of unbundled network
elements in a competitive environment is conceptually re-
lated to the economics of forward-looking pricing, it is not
causally related to the use of the TELRIC Plus. Thus, any
diminishment in ILEC property values resulting from compe-
tition is not properly compensable as a taking without just
compensation arising from use of the TELPJC Plus methodology.
The ILECs do not claim that Congressional action to permit
competition, itself, implicates the Fifth Amendment takings
clause. In fact, they cannot because the Act establishes a
scheme providing compensation for property that may be de-
valued. See supra text and accompanying notes 53-65.
78 See, e.g., Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. PSC-
96-0811-FOF-TP, Dkt. No. 950984-TP, at 22 (June 24, 1996).
79 See FCC Order, supra note 13, para. 640.
noted above, legitimate government action justly
compensated implicates no constitutional con-
cerns.82 The ILECs have raised no general consti-
tutional challenges to the statutory scheme Con-
gress has enacted. This may reflect the ILECs
recognition of the legitimacy of the government
purpose and the fact that the multiple facets of
the Act's statutory scheme do in fact provide just
compensation for any perceived taking.
The ILECs base their takings claim on their as-
sertion that use of the TELRIC Plus methodology
will deny them recoupment through unbundled
network revenues of all historic and/or embed-
ded costs and profit, contrary to the reasonable
expectations of their investors. 3 To ensure that a
taking does not occur, the ILECs argue that the
pricing methodology must guarantee the recovery
of all prudently incurred costs of investing in local
networks. 4 The incumbent carriers also contend
that the Takings Clause requires state public ser-
vice commissions and the FCC to allow the carri-
ers sufficient recovery of invested capital "to main-
tain its credit, to attract capital, and to ensure a
return that will be commensurate with invest-
ments of a similar risk."85 The incumbent carriers
point to the Supreme Court's statements in Federal
Power Commission. v. Hope Natural Gas Co.86 that
the utility's rates must provide for capital costs as
well as operating expenses.87 In Hope Natural Gas,
the Court stated that "the return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on
investments in other enterprises having corre-
sponding risks. That return, moreover, should be
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial in-
tegrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital."8 8
80 See id. paras. 639-40. For example, fiber optic Digital
Loop Carrier technologies available today are more cost ef-
fective than the copper wire loops previously employed. In
addition, ILECs continue to carry the costs related to older
telephone loop architectures such as those utilized to pro-
vide multiple party lines. These architectures often contain
thousands of feet of cable that can no longer serve its in-
tended use given the predominance of single party lines in
the telecommunication networks of today.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82 See supra text accompanying note 45.
83 GTE Takings Report, supra note 75, at 32-33.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 16.
86 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
87 GTE Takings Report, supra note 75, at 15 (citing to Hope
Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603).
88 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603.
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The TELRIC Plus methodology specifically ex-
cludes contribution to embedded costs in excess
of forward-looking costs.8 9 Unbundled network
element revenues, therefore, may not recover all
historic costs of producing these elements.90 This
is consistent, however, with takings law which per-
mits the establishment of rates that are just, rea-
sonable, non-confiscatory, and reflective of mar-
ket values. Analysis of the incumbent carrier's
claims at varying levels demonstrates that use of
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology does not
give rise to an unconstitutional taking, and com-
plies with Supreme Court case law for state regula-
tory actions.
A. Use of TELRIC Plus Does Not Constitute a
"Categorical" Taking
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal CounciP identified only two categorical in-
stances in which governmental action goes be-
yond regulation and effects a taking requiring just
compensation where the governmental action:
(1) results in physical appropriation; or (2) de-
prives the owner of "all economically beneficial or
productive use of [property]."92 Application of
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology, developed
in accordance with the Act's admonition that
rates be 'just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory,"
does not result in a "categorical" taking under Lu-
cas. Even considering only those revenues gener-
ated through TELRIC-based unbundled network
element prices, the ILECs, under the Act, receive
compensation for the market value of their prop-
erty. Indeed, the ILECs' network elements have
multiple economic uses. Not only may ILECs
make money on the sale of these elements to mar-
ket entrants, but the ILEC itself uses these net-
work elements to provide a myriad of telecommu-
nications service packages to existing ILEC retail
89 See FCC Order, supra note 13, paras. 704-06.
90 Id. para. 706 ("regulation does not and should not
guarantee full recovery of [an ILECs'] embedded costs").
91 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
92 Id. at 1015. The Lucus Court held that a categorical
taking had occurred where the owner was required "to sacri-
fice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the com-
mon good." Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). See also Love-
ladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (finding that "this is a case in which the owner of
the relevant parcel was deprived of all economically feasible
use") (emphasis added).
93 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (noting the "essentially ad hoc, factual" na-
customers. These services also may be sold indi-
vidually to market entrants as wholesale services
subject to resale. In addition, elements bundled
into service offerings also generate considerable
revenues through access charges levied against
long distance carriers seeking to transport and
terminate long distance calls on the ILECs net-
works.
Where no "categorical" taking exists, the deter-
mination of what constitutes a compensable tak-
ing requires an intensely factual inquiry, for
which, the Supreme Court has oft noted, no es-
tablished formula exists:93
While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee is designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole," this Court, quite simply, has
been unable to develop any "set formula" for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness" require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportion-
ately concentrated on a few persons.9 4
This lack of rigid criteria has led the Supreme
Court to focus on two primary factors in deter-
mining the existence of a taking requiring just
compensation: (1) the economic impact of the
regulatory scheme; and (2) the extent to which
the scheme impairs distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations. 95
B. Any Negative Economic Impact Is Not
Sufficient to Constitute a Taking
"[I]n a wide variety of contexts th[e] govern-
ment may execute laws or programs that adversely
affect recognized economic values" without its ac-
tion constituting a taking.96 Under the Lucas
calculus, however, the Court will consider evi-
dence of economic impact in considering
whether government regulatory action constitutes
ture of the takings analysis).
94 Id. at 123-24.
95 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 124); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1005 (1984); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (treating, as
a third factor, the character of the governmental action as
physical invasion or mere regulatory adjustment of the "ben-
efits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good").
96 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (recognizing that the gov-
ernment's exercise of its power to tax for the general welfare
is an "obvious" example of a noncompensable economic im-
pact).
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a taking requiring just compensation.97 Compen-
sation may be necessary where the regulatory
scheme effects a "partial taking" resulting in the
loss of some, but not all, the property's value.98
While a claimant alleging economic impact may
not receive compensation for a mere diminution
in the economic use of property,99 loss of some-
what greater value may constitute a partial tak-
ing. 00
Significantly, it is the overall impact of a regula-
tory scheme and not merely the impact of a par-
ticular requirement therein that determines the
extent to which economic impact is present.10 1 In
Colorado Springs, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia considered the claim,
brought by an agricultural Production Credit As-
sociation against the Farm Credit Administration,
that forced contribution of funds to less healthy
agricultural financial institutions under the Agri-
cultural Credit Act of 1987 constituted a taking
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 102 In deter-
mining that no taking without just compensation
had occurred, the District Court considered the
"'significant number of provisions in the Act that
moderate and mitigate the economic impact' of
the statute at issue."1 03 In attempting to demon-
strate economic impact, a claimant bears the
heavy burden of demonstrating that the regula-
tory decision, in its entirety, is both unjust and un-
reasonable. 0 4
Reliance on lack of profitability in one portion
of a business establishes no taking. As the
Supreme Court in Hope Natural Gas observed, " [i] t
97 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
98 Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1180; Florida Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
99 The term "mere diminution" refers to a decreases in
property value "resulting from shared economic im-
pacts[,] ... in which the property owner has in a sense been
compensated by the public program 'adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."' Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Penn Cen-
tral, 438 U.S. at 124).
100 Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568 (noting that the inquiry
for a "partial taking" is whether "there was some (but not a
total) reduction in the overall market value of plaintiffs
property as a result of the regulatory imposition") (emphasis
in original).
101 See, e.g., Colorado Springs Production Credit Assoc. v.
Farm Credit Admin., 758 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1991); Du-
quesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989) (quot-
ing Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
102 Colorado Springs, 758 F. Supp. at 6.
103 Id. at 13 (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).
is not theory but the impact of the rate order
which counts. If the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial in-
quiry . .. is at an end."105 Thus, in considering
the effect of the government action, the effect of
the entire regulatory scheme must be taken into
account - the prices for unbundled network ele-
ments, the revenue from resale, the revenue from
long distance, and any other compensation the
ILEC receives as owner of the unbundled network
elements.
The ILECs rely on the Supreme Court's state-
ments in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission
of Louisana0 6 for the proposition that a statutory
scheme effects a taking if it causes a regulated en-
tity to lose money in any facet of its business oper-
ations.' 07 Brooks-Scanlon, however, simply stands
for the proposition that a regulated entity must be
permitted to go out of business rather than oper-
ate, in its entirety, at a loss. 08 If it remains in
business, the regulated entity may nevertheless be
compelled to continue service in a particular area
of its business even though operation of this activ-
ity involves a loss.' 09 As noted by the Court, "the
Constitution does not confer upon the company
the right to continue to enjoy the [regulatory]
franchise or indeterminate permit and escape
from the burdens incident to its use."110
The ILECs can demonstrate no financial bur-
den, as a preliminary matter, because all compen-
satory mechanisms of the Act are not yet imple-
mented' and because no substantial level of
competition requiring sales of unbundled net-
104 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254,
1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
105 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).
106 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
107 GTE Takings Report, supra note 75, at 12 (citing Brooks-
Scanlon, 251 U.S. at 399) ("A carrier cannot be compelled to
carry on even a branch of business at a loss, much less the
whole business of carriage.").
108 Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267
U.S. 330, 333 (1925) (construing Brooks-Scanlon as holding
only that a utility cannot "be compelled to continue to oper-
ate its [entire] system at a loss").
109 Id.
110 Id. This issue is central to any taking analysis, particu-
larly given the Act's provisions regarding the entrance of in-
cumbent carriers into the long distance market and other ar-
eas which are benefits to the public interest. See 47 U.S.C.A.
§§ 271, 272 (West Supp. 1996); see also House Conf Report,
supra note 2, at 113.
M11 FCC proceedings that will also determine the level of
additional compensation to ILECs are still pending final
rules as of the completion of this article. They include the
implementation of Section 254 of the Telecommunications
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work elements at TELRIC-based prices yet exists
in the local exchange market.112 In addition,
under Hope Natural Gas, no economic impact can
arise simply from the use of the TELRIC Plus
methodology. Only the end result, the impact of
the use of TELRIC Plus, in connection with the
other economic impacts of the act, may create a
basis for a takings claim.113 In any event, absent
implementation of the entire new statutory
scheme, any takings claim is premature.
Even if the ILECs' takings claim were not pre-
mature, Supreme Court precedent suggests that,
under the regulatory takings analysis, a severe fi-
nancial burden would only exist if the agency's
chosen rate-making methodology produced rates
so low as to leave insufficient operating capital or
impede the ILECs ability to raise future capital.11 4
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC,115 the D.C. Cir-
cuit examined an ILEC's assertion that the FCC
rate formula was confiscatory because it excluded
part of the carrier's original investment from the
rate base.116 The court rejected this contention,
noting that "[t]here simply has been no demon-
stration that the FCC's rate base policy threatens
the financial integrity of [the incumbent carriers]
or otherwise impedes their ability to attract capi-
tal."' 1 7 Accordingly, the court held that the FCC
was under no obligation to base rates on all histor-
ical costs for investments prudent when made.118
Act, Universal Service, CC Dkt. No. 96-45; and Interstate Ac-
cess Charge Reform, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, and
96-263.
112 Although a number of states have adopted TELRIC
Plus, or a similar methodology, FCC Order, supra note 13,
para. 681, actual use in the marketplace has been slow be-
cause of challenges to its constitutionality, even on the state
level. See GTE Takings Report, supra note 75.
113 See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("[i]t is not theory but the impact
of the rate order which counts;" rather, it is only necessary
that the "total effect" be just and reasonable).
114 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312
(1989). The Supreme Court reviewed a state-imposed rate
order and found that it was not constitutionally objectiona-
ble. The Court found that "[n]o argument has been made
that these slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial in-
tegrity of the companies, either by leaving them insufficient
operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise future
capital." Id. The Court further found that there had been
no demonstration "that these rates are inadequate to com-
pensate current equity holders for the risk associated with
their investments under a modified prudent investment
scheme." Id. at 312.
115 988 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
116 Id. at 1258.
117 Id.; see also Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 312 (exclusion of
certain prudent investment costs does not render rate order
Similarly, the TELRIC Plus methodology will
not deny the ability to attract capital. Despite the
fact that the ILECs have, in recent years, written
off billions of dollars of embedded investment to
conform depreciations lives with those in the
competitive market,119 these write-offs have not
resulted in greatly reduced stock prices or other-
wise impeded ILECs' abilities to raise capital. 120
In fact, while write-offs have decreased dividends
for the years in which they are taken, Wall Street
has generally applauded these efforts as prepara-
tion for inevitable competition. Where, as here,
the ILECs have had every opportunity to submit
evidence of any sharp decline in share prices,
their silence in this regard speaks loudly.12'
Moreover, because the TELRIC Plus methodology
by definition includes the costs of attracting capi-
tal, use of this methodology, going forward, in-
sures that no economic hardship of constitutional
proportions will arise.
C. TELRIC Plus Pricing Does Not Frustrate
Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The second factor is the extent to which the
..regulation ... interfere [s] with [the] distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations" of the individuals
upon which the statutory burden is placed. 22
Any such reasonable expectation must be based
constitutionally infirm).
118 Illinois Bell, 988 F.2d at 1263.
119 See, e.g., BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-20,A-
26-27; GTE 1995 Annual Report, supra note 24, at 32-33.
120 In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2906, para. 40 (1992) (re-
jecting claim that rule was confiscatory on grounds that ILEC
"made no showing that supports a finding that it is unable to
attract capital.")
121 To the contrary, since passage of the Act, Wall Street
reports that the ILECs have experienced robust revenue and
earnings-per-share growth. See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, INC., UNITED STATES TELECOM SERVICES
RBOCs & GTE 2 (Feb. 19, 1997). As of the fourth quarter of
1996, RBOC/GTE share prices were, in fact, outperforming
the market. Id. at 4. Moreover, investment risk ratings have
remained constant, and Merrill Lynch, at least, rates invest-
ment in the ILECs as "Accumulate or higher." Id. at 3. Signifi-
cantly, Wall Street perceived passage of the Act as "a very pro-
RBOC rewrite of telecommunications regulation." MERRILL
LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., UNITED STATES
TELECOM SERVICES - RBOCs & GTE 2 (Feb. 23, 1996). As a
result, Wall Street predicts an improved outlook for the
ILECs and "the opposite for the larger long distance companies." Id.
at cover page (emphasis added).
122 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 n.8 (1992); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
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on other than a "'unilateral expectation or an ab-
stract need,'"1 2 3 and it is not enough that a new
duty imposed on a regulated entity "upsets other-
wise settled expectations." 124 As the Court noted
in Connolly, "[t]hose who do business in the regu-
lated field cannot object if the legislative scheme
is buttressed by subsequent amendments to
achieve the legislative end"125 - an expectation is
reasonable only if based on an "explicit govern-
mental guarantee." 26
The mere existence of benefits and obligations
established under a particular regulatory scheme
creates no reasonable expectation that the gov-
ernment will not alter these benefits and obliga-
tions to the detriment of individual property val-
ues. This is particularly true in industries that
"long ha[ve] been the focus of great public con-
cern and significant government regulation."1 27
Moreover, when the statutory scheme regulates
interdependent entities such as the ILECs and
long distance providers, any single entity may, in
fact, expect regulatory changes for the good of
the whole which may adversely affect an individ-
ual entity.' 2 8
The ILECs argue that state commissions,
through a regulatory compact, have promised
them recovery of all embedded costs plus
profit,129 and according to the ILECs, this regula-
tory compact gives rise to reasonable investment-
backed expectations. 3 0 As noted above, however,
under established Supreme Court precedent, no
reasonable investment-backed expectation may
exist absent an express guarantee giving rise to
distinct expectations. State commissions emphati-
cally have denied the existence of any guarantee
that the ILECs will recover all costs plus profit on
their investment.' 3 As noted by the Florida Pub-
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
123 Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (citation omitted).
124 Connolly v. Pension Guaranty Benefit Trust Corp.,
475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986).
125 Id. at 227 (citing Federal Housing Admin. v. Darling-
ton, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
126 Ruckeishaus, 467 U.S. at 1011.
127 Id. at 1008.
128 See Colorado Springs Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farm
Credit Admin., 758 F. Supp. 6, 15 (D.D.C. 1991); see also
Amarillo Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 887 F.2d
507, 512 (5th Cir. 1989).
129 See, e.g., Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No.
PSC-96-0811-FOF-TP, Dkt. No. 950984-TP, at 21 (June 24,
1996).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 21-22.
lic Service Commission with regard to takings
claims raised by GTE of Florida,
[i]mplicit in GTEFL's arguments is the notion that this
Commission owes GTEFL an increase in local rates to
replace the company's potential losses of expected con-
tribution and profit .... GTEFL does not have a per se
statutory right that it must recover profit and contribu-
tion as a result of unbundling and reselling services.
Even under the rate-base regulation regime . . . GTEFL
was merely afforded the opportunity to earn a fair re-
turn on its investment, not a guarantee of return. Fur-
ther, under the new, price-regulated regime . . . that
GTEFL has elected, GTEFL is not guaranteed a specific
return in this competitive environment.' 3 2
Indeed, a rate formula need not guarantee a
profit.'33 As the D.C. Circuit has noted, "[a] regu-
lated utility has no constitutional right to a profit,
and a company that is unable to survive without
charging exploitative rates has no entitlement to
such rates."13 4
Moreover, under rate-of-return regulation,
ILECs were merely afforded the opportunity to
earn a fair return. In recent years, many ILECs
have shifted to price cap regulation, eschewing
the security of the rate of return regulation for
the promise of the marketplace. 35 Under price
caps, the ILECs have sought the freedom to earn
increased profits. In exchange, they have pro-
posed to accept greater economic risk.136 Bell-
South, for example, has stated that price cap regu-
lation is the cornerstone of its corporate
strategy.' 37 BellSouth further states that "[d]ue in
part to this strategy, . . . a significant portion of
BellSouth Telecommunications' revenue will no
longer be regulated based on the recovery of specific
costs."' 38 The ILECs' election of price cap regula-
tion, too, suggests that the ILECs can have no rea-
sonable investment-backed interest in the regula-
tory status quo.
132 Id.
1ss See Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S.
548, 550 (1945); Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942)
134 Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d
1168, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
1s5 See, e.g., BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-14.
136 See, e.g., In re Application of GTE South for Price Reg-
ulation (Raleigh, NC), Before the North Carolina Util.
Comm'n., Dkt. No. P-19, DUB 2377 (1995) at 12 ("[P]rice
regulation provides increased incentives for the Company to
invest in new and innovative products and services in North
Carolina, while the risks of these new investments are borne
by the stockholder rather than the customer.").
'37 BellSouth 1996 Notice, supra note 24, at A-12.
138 Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally, investors have been on notice, at least
since divestiture, of the possibility that regulators
would seek competition, at least where the "natu-
ral monopoly" has given way to the economic or
technological possibility of competition.139 Ac-
cording to some commentators, the move toward
competition in telecommunications industry has
been evident since the 1950s. 140 In 1971, the FCC
determined that new carriers could enter the in-
terexchange market, signifying clear governmen-
tal intent to permit competition in telecommuni-
cations. 141  No later than 1994, Competitive
Access Providers ("CAPs") and other competitors
such as cellular, new wireless technologies (such
as Personal Communications Services), and cable
provided the unmistakable capability to compete
for areas of the ILECs' market in the local ex-
changes. 1 4 2 In 1994, FCC Chairman Hundt af-
firmed the Commission's commitment to "intro-
ducing competition into the local exchange
market."1 4 3
Thus, as BellSouth recognized in price cap reg-
ulation proceedings begun over a year and a half
ago:
[imn a monopoly environment, the regulator estab-
lished a rate of return and a revenue requirement
which provided the opportunity for the utility to re-
cover its investment over the life of such investment.
Today, with the changes in technology and accelerating
competition, the regulator can no longer reasonably predict
or provide this opportunity.144
As a result of the pervasive and long-standing
governmental interest in the possibility of effec-
tive competition in telecommunications markets
and specifically in the local exchange market
since divestiture of AT&T, no reasonable ILEC in-
vestor could have expected that the local ex-
change market would remain a monopoly forever.
Moreover, investors are on present notice of the
advent of competition and use of TELRIC Plus to
price unbundled network elements in the local
exchange market. As previously indicated, ILEC
investors have not experienced significant eco-
nomic impacts of the Act to date. Accordingly,
139 See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F.Supp. 131, 160,
165 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
140 Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by
Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunica-
tions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983).
141 See Cullari, supra note 58, at 175.
142 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Telephone, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (addressing propriety of FCC rule intended to
any future losses they may experience will be due
only to unreasonable investor-backed expecta-
tions and implicate no constitutional concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 seeks to
encourage competition in all facets of the tele-
communications industry. The changes brought
about by this statute significantly adjust the bur-
dens and benefits which the regulatory framework
accords industry participants, permitting long dis-
tance carriers and other would-be entrants into lo-
cal markets and allowing ILECs reciprocal entry
into the long distance market.
Interpreting the Act, many state commissions
have priced unbundled network elements using
forward-looking pricing methodologies including
TELRIC Plus (which the FCC determined simu-
lates prices that would be paid in a competitive
market). ILEC claims that cost-based TELRIC
Plus rates effect a taking without just compensa-
tion are without merit. First, these arguments are
premature because they precede implementation
of the full statutory scheme the Act establishes.
Second, the statutory scheme justly compensates
incumbent carriers for the use of their unbundled
network elements both through cost-based
TELRIC Plus rates, alone, and through the other
rights and privileges afforded ILECs under the
Act. Finally, consideration of: (1) economic im-
pacts due to the Act; and (2) the basis for invest-
ment-backed expectations of continued monop-
oly rents suggests that the statutory scheme has
resulted in no significant, negative economic
harm to ILECs and that investors no longer may
claim reasonable investment-backed expectations
in the status quo. Accordingly, neither the Act nor
the TELRIC Plus pricing methodology constitutes
a taking without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
promote competition local telecommunications markets); see
also Cullari, supra note 58, at 176.
143 Chairman Reed Hundt, Toward Regulation that Fosters
Competition, 39 FED. COM. L. J. 265, 266 (1994).
144 In re Application of BellSouth Telecommunications.
Inc. for, and Election of, Price Regulation, Before the North
Carolina Util. Comm'n, Dkt. No. P-55, SUB 1013 (1996), at
25 (emphasis added).
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